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THE RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL
UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
HAROLD E. HURST
Professor, Univ. of Denver College of Law
The right of an accused in state criminal proceedings to be rep-
resented by counsel has frequently been claimed as a necessary
element of the fair hearing inherent in due process of law required
of the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The right to be represented by counsel in federal criminal pro-
ceedings is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment but no specific
mention of the right to counsel in state proceedings is to be found
in the Constitution. The Court has consistently refused to rule
that the procedural protections of the Bill of Rights are a cata-
logue of rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against
state encroachment., And so, as might be expected, the Court has
adamantly refused to hold that representation by counsel in crimi-
nal proceedings is a fixed and specific requirement of due process.
Rather, due process or the lack of it depends upon whether in the
judgment of the Court the proceeding is characterized by fairness
-- or the lack of it. The principle has found expression in the fol-
lowing language:
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the conviction
and incarceration of one whose trial is offensive to the
common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right, and
while want of counsel in a particular case may result in
a conviction lacking in such fundamental fairness, we can-
not say that the Amendment embodies an inexorable com-
mand that no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be
fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is
not represented by counsel..
2
And to bolster its judgment in the matter, the Court has tabu-
lated provisions of state constitutions and statutes, concluding that
a majority of the states appeared not to consider representation by
counsel fundamental to a fair trial in all situations.
What, then, is a fair trial in which the defendant is not repre-
sented by counsel? The following sections indicate the conditions
and circumstances which may run so contrary to the Court's col-
lective sense of fair play as to result in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
ILLITERACY, YOUTH, IGNORANCE, INTELLIGENCE OF THE DEFENDENDANT
There is a clear relationship in the Court's mind between a de-
fendant's capacity to prepare and present a defense and the fair-
ness of a criminal proceeding against the defendant without coun-
'Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14, 53 L. Ed. 97 (1908); Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46 67 S. Ct. 1672, 91 L. Ed. 1903 (1947); Wolf v. Colorado 338 U.S. 25, 69 S. Ct. 1359,
93 L. Ed. 1782 (1949); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 74 5. Ct. 381, 98 L. Ed. 324 (1954).
i Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 62 S. Ct. 1252, 86 L. Ed. 1595 (1942).
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sel. The Court has frequently drawn the inference s that defendants
who were young, ignorant, illiterate and inexperienced were not
capable of making a defense, and has declared that to put such in-
dividuals on trial without counsel is fundamentally unfair and con-
sequently is not due process.
Paradoxical though it be, the burden of establishing the in-
capacity or inability of a defendant to obtain a fair hearing without
counsel falls upon the defendant himself. Obviously, cases involv-
ing the question usually come into a lawyer's hands only after
trial and conviction of the defendant. The lawyer's decision
whether to raise the issue of unfairness because of lack of counsel
requires a careful study of the pretrial and trial proceedings and
an investigation of the personal characteristics of the defendant,
because the factors which indicate lack of capacity to defend-
youth, illiteracy, inexperience, mental deficiency-are matters of
degree and exist in different combinations.
Trial of one incapable of defending himself adequately with-
out counsel may not be considered "offensive to the common and
fundamental ideas of fairness and right" if counsel is provided in
time to raise the question of the fairness of the proceeding, or if
the court adequately safeguards the defendant from prejudicial
error.4
3 In the following cases convictions have ben reversed or remanded to determine the truth of
the allegations of persons seeking release on the grounds that trial without counsel was unfair:
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 527 (1932); House v. Mayo,
324 U.S. 42, 65 S. Ct. 989, 89 L. Ed. 1367 (1945); Wad v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 68 S. Ct. 1270,
92 L. Ed. 1647 (1948); DeMeerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 633, 67 S. Ct. 596, 91 L. Ed. 584 (1947);
Uveges v. Pennsvlvani,. 335 U.S. 437. 69 S. Ct. 184, 93 L. Ed. 127 (1948); Palmer v. Ashe, 342
U.S. 142, 72 S. Ct. 191, 96 L. Ed. 154 (1951); Reece v. Georgia, _ U.S. _ , 76 S. Ct. 167. -- L.
Ed. (1955); M-ssev v. Moore 348 U.S. 105 75 S. Ct. 145, 99 L. Ed. 134 (1954); Chandler v.
Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 75 S. Ct. 1, 99 L. Ed. 4 (1954).
'h- Co.rt h-s refused to reverse convictions in: Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 62 S. Ct. 1252,
86 L. Ed. 1595 (1942) Gayes v. New York, 332 U.S. 145, 67 S. Ct. 1711, 91 L. Ed. 1962 (1947);
Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 68 S. Ct. 763, 92 L. Ed. 986 (1948); Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728,
68 S. Ct. 1256, 92 L. Ed. 1683 (1948); Quicksall v. Michigan 339 U.S. 660, 70 S. Ct. 910, 94 L. Ed.
1188 (1950); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 72 S.Ct. 141, 96 L.Ed. 86 (1951).
4 Counsel appointed in time to object to prejudicial errors: Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82,
66 S. Ct. 452, 90 L. Ed. 545 (1946); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 72 S. Ct. 141, 96 L. Ed.
99 (1951); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 60 S. Ct. 321, 84 L. Ed. 377 (1940). Cf. Reese v.
Georgia, U.S. .. . 76 S. Ct. 167, L. Ed. (1955).
Rights of the defendant adequately protected by the trial judge: Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S.
173, 67 S. Ct. 216, 91 L. Ed 172 (1946); Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 67 S. Ct. 1716, 91 L. Ed.
1955 (1947); Quicksoll v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660, 70 S. Ct. 910, 94 L. Ed. 1188 (1950).
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COMPLEXITIES OF CHARGE-TECHNICALITIES OF DEFENSE
Although an accused appears in all respects to be of normal
intelligence and experience, conviction without the assistance of
counsel (unless intelligently waived) may be a deprivation of lib-
erty without due process of law where close technical distinctions
between the degrees of crime and available defenses present com-
plex problems in the presentation of evidence and instructions to
the jury. The Supreme Court has reversed convictions where the
offense charge was distinguishable from other lesser crimes only
by technical differences in the evidence required to convict, differ-
ent instructions to the jury, and availability of different defenses,
the Court saying that such complexities "are a closed book to the
average layman."5 The Court considers such trials unfair.,
Although no such cases have come before the Supreme Court,
it is reasonable to expect that the Court would hold representa-
tion by counsel to be necessary to a fair hearing before an admin-
istrative tribunal or a court in a civil matter where the issues are
complex and the proof difficult. For instance, matters such as
the public convenience and necessity or the compensability of an
industrial injury and the extent of the disability are a "closed
book to the average layman." The applicant for a truck licensing
permit or the injured workman seeking workman's compensa-
tion, appearing without a lawyer or other expert representative
because he is unaware of the pitfalls ahead, would seem to be
placing his rights in danger unfairly unless the tribunal concerned
itself affirmatively in the protection of such rights in the absence
of counsel.
OPPORTUNITY OF COUNSFL TO PREPARE-EFFECTIVE COUNSEL
The fair hearing required by due process of law includes an
opportunity to prepare and present such defenses as may be avail-
able. It would seem to follow that appointment of counsel at such
a time as to make it impossible for him to prepare for trial likewise
deprives those defendants of liberty without due process who need
counsel because of incapacity. This view of requirement of due
process seems to have been applied by the Court in the few cases
presenting the issue.
7
It would seem also, although there are no state cases reversing
convictions on that ground, that trial of a defendant who needs
counsel but who is represented by counsel so obviously negligent
or incompetent as to be of no assistance is inconsistent with the
constitutional guarantee of a fair trial. If appointment of counsel
at such time as to render his assistance valueless does not satisfy
5 Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 65 S. Ct 363, 89 L. Ed. 398 (1945).
eTomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485, 65 S. Ct. 370, 89 L. Ed. 407 (1945); Rice v. Olson 324
U.S. 786, 65 S. Ct 989, 89 L. Ed. 1367 (1945); Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 66 S. Ct. 116, 90
L. Ed. 61 (1945); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 5. Ct. 1252, 92 L. Ed. 1690 (1948). Cf.
Betts v. Brady, 316 U 5. 455, 62 5. Ct. 1252, 86 L. Ed. 1595 (1942); Gryger v. Burke ,334 U.S.
728,, 68 5. Ct. 1256, 92 L. Ed. 1683 (1948).
, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158, 84 A.L R. 527 (1932); Hawk v.
Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 66 5. Ct. 116, 90 L. Ed 61 (1945); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 65 5. St.
978, 89 L. Ed. 1348 (1945); Reece v. Georgia, . U.S. -, 76 5. Ct. 167. .-- L. Ed ._ (1955).
Cf. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 60 S. Ct 321, 84 L. Ed. 377 (1940); Canizio v. New York,
327 U.S. 82, 66 S. Ct. 452, 90 L. Ed. 545 (1946); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S 181, 72 S. Ct.
599, vo L. Ed. 872 (1952); Michel v. Louisiana, _ U.S.. , 76 5 Ct. 167, ___ L. Ed . -- (1955).
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due process, then neither does the appointment of counsel of such
kind as to render his assistance valueless."
CONDUCT OF THE POLICE OR PROSECUTOR
Aside from coercing confessions from defendants, police or
prosecutors frequently obtain convictions or pleas of guilty by
deception practiced upon a defendant who is without counsel.
Some trials are unfair because a defendant who needs counsel
is not provided with counsel." It goes without saying that such a
trial is even more repugnant to the requirements of due process
if the defendant is also the victim of deception or misrepresenta-
tion. Such is clearly the view of the Supreme Court.'" Similarly,
although the degree of unfairness is lesser, it appears to be a viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment for the police or prosecutor to
practice deception and misrepresentation on a defendant who
might otherwise have been considered capable of presenting his
defense without counsel."
The logic of due process, which is the rule of fairness when
procedure is being considered, also appears in those cases which
the Court has refused to reverse. There would seem to be no par-
ticular unfairness in a conviction resulting from a proceeding in
which deception, misrepresentation or "deals," promising the drop-
ping of other charges or a lighter sentence in return for a plea of
guilty, are perpetrated upon a defendant without counsel, if the
defendant is afforded counsel in time to raise objections to the
procedure and otherwise to protect the defendant's rights.'
2
S This issue might well have been raised in Powell v. Alabama, Hawk v. Olson, and White
v. Rogen (see note 7 above), in which the Court declared a failure of a fair trial where defend-
ants were denied "effective aid and assistance" of counsel. From the circumstances as reported,
however, it appears that the Court may have been indulgent toward counsel since the lack of
effective aid and assistance" seemed at least in part the result of inefficient or inattentive
counsel, rather than of lack of time to prepare. The issue was specifically raised and decided
against the defendant in Poret et al. v. Louisiana, ._ U.S ...., 76 S. Ct. 158, .--. L. Ed'. . (1955).
$Supra.
1" Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 69 S. Ct. 184, 93 L. Ed. 127 (1948); Palmer v. Ashe,
342 U S. 142, 72 S. Ct. 191, 96 L. Ed. 154 (1951).
"Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 61 5. Ct. 572, 85 L. Ed. 859 (1941), wherein the defendant,
told he was charged with burglary but prevented from seeing the indictments, and told he
would receive a sentence of not over three years if he would plead guilty, found later that he
would plead guilty, found later that he had actually pleaded guilty to a more serious charge
with a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years.
" Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82, 66 S. Ct 452, 90 L. Ed. 545 (1946); Gallegos v.
Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 72 S. Ct. 141, 96 L. Ed. 86 (1951); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181,
72 S. Ct 599, 96 L. Ed. 872 (1952).
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CONDUCT OF TRIAL
The trial judge is the key figure in any proceeding wherein
a person's life, liberty or property is affected. The fairness of the
proceeding is primarily the responsibility of the judge. Even when
trial of a defendant without counsel would not necessarily be a
violation of the constitutional right to due process, the deportment
of the trial judge or the manner of conducting the trial may never-
the less be so prejudicial as to render the trial unfair. Substantial
prejudice may arise in many ways-the admission of incompetent
or prejudicial evidence, exclusion of material evidence favorable
to the defendant, improper remarks by the judge or prosecutor in
the presence of the jury, intimidation of the defendant to plead
guilty, misrepresentation in explaining the charge to the defend-
ant. The bounds of ordinary decency would seem to have been
exceeded in any trial without counsel in which such practices
were permitted, and so seems the Court to look upon the matter."
Where a defendant is not incapable of providing an adequate
defense and the trial court properly advises the defendant, fail-
ure to offer appointed counsel is not a denial of the right to a fair
trial. Three cases are noted" in which the trial judge explained
to the defendants the consequences of a plea of guilty, the right
to counsel, the right to a jury trial and the degree of proof which
would be required to convict, but in which the defendants never-
theless elected to plead guilty. All three cases were affirmed
when the defendants sought release on the ground of lack of coun-
sel and denial of a fair hearing. Here, it would seem, the judge has
done all that counsel could do to safeguard the rights of the de-
fendant, and the defendant, having been made aware of his rights
and the difficulties ahead, has intelligently waived his right to
counsel. It is clear that a defendant who is capable of understand-
ing the nature and significance of the proceeding can waive his
right to be represented by counsel.'
SERIOUSNESS OF THE OFFENSE
The seriousness of the offense with which the defendant is
charged-whether the penalty be capital punishment or imprison-
ment-is of little consequence in determining if counsel must be
appointed. Although there appear in the cases statements that indi-
cate a disposition on the part of the Court to require the appoint-
ment of counsel in capital cases, the actual reason for the decisions
appears to be the requirement that in any case-capital or other-
wise-the proceeding be fair in the sense that a defendant who is
without counsel be intelligent and experienced enough to defend
himself adequately or to waive counsel intelligently, taking into
's House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 65 S. Ct. 517, 89 L. Ed. 739 (1945); Townsend v. Burke, 334
U.S. 736, 68 S. Ct. 1252, 92 L. Ed 1690 (1948); Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 69 S. Ct. 1247, 93
L. Ed. 1686 (1949); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. U.S. 257, 68 S. Ct. 499, 92 L. Ed 682 (1948).
.' Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 67 S. Ct. 216, 91 L Ed. 172 1946); Foster v. Illinois, 332
U.S. 134, 67 S. Ct. 1716, 91 L. Ed. 1955 (1947); Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660, 70 S Ct.
910, 94 L. Ed. 1188 (1950).
15Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S 728, 68 S. Ct. 1256, 92 L. Ed. 1683 (1948) and cases cited in
footnote 14 above. See also Poret et al. v. Louisiana .... U.S. -, 76 S. Ct. 158, ___ L. Ed. _
(1955), in which the defendant, in his flight to avoid apprehension, was deemed to have waived
his right to counsel for the purpose of attacking the validity of the indictment, time for which
attack expired while defendant was a fugitive in another state.
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consideration the complexity of the issues and the conduct of the
investigation and trial. In Powell v. Alabama,16 a capital case, the
Court said, "All that it is necessary now to decide, as we do decide,
is that in a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ
counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense
because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it
is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign coun-
sel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law . . ." Four
other cases have reached the Supreme Court in which defendants
were on trial for capital offenses and did not have counsel. In
three of them 17 the Court reversed state court dismissals of peti-
tions for habeas corpus on the authority of Powell v. Alabama,
interpreting the Alabama case to mean that "at least in capital
offenses" where the defendant is incapable of making an adequate
defense there must be representation by counsel. The emphasis
in each case is upon the incapacity of the defendant rather than
upon the seriousness of the offense. In the fourth case, 8 the rights
of the defendant to have a lawyer, the degree of proof necessary
to convict, the right to trial by jury, and the consequences of a
plea of guilty were explained by the trial judge to the defendant
who nevertheless elected to plead guilt. In this capital case, where
the trial judge took great pains, short of actual appointment of
counsel, to avoid any unfairness or prejudice, the conviction was
affirmed.
No case has as yet reached the Court on the right to counsel
issue wherein a defendant, on trial for a capital offense, and not
shown to be incapable of representing himself, elected to stand
trial without the aid of counsel and was convicted. Since the basic
consideration in right to counsel cases is the fairness of the pro-
ceeding, taking into account all the circumstances, it seems un-
likely that the Supreme Court would require the appointment of
counsel in such a case solely because the offense charged threat-
ened capital punishment. The Court has refused to reverse con-
'e287 U.S. 45, 53 S Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 527 (1932).
"7 Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 65 S. Ct. 363, 89 L. Ed. 398 (1945); Tomkins v. Missouri,
323 U.S. 485, 65 S. Ct. 370, 89 L Ed. 407 (1945); Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 66 S. Ct. 116,
90 L. Ed. 61 (1945).
ICarter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 67 S. Ct. 216, 91 L. Ed. 172 (1946)
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victions in noncapital cases wherein the defendant intelligently
elected to stand trial and make his own defense.
Furthermore, the consideration of fairness of the proceeding
runs through noncapital state felony cases as the basis for deci-
sion, rather than the seriousness of the offense. Typical lauguage
appears in Palmer v. Ashe.1" "This Court has repeatedly held that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
states to afford defendants assistance of counsel in noncapital
criminal cases when there are special circumstances showing that
without a lawyer a defendant could not have an adequate and fair
defense."
Convictions without counsel have been reversed or remanded
wherein the charge was burglary, 20 robbery,2 1 larceny, 22 and con-
fidence game.2 In no case has the Court placed its refusal to con-
sider a proceeding violative of the Fourteenth Amendment on the
ground that the offense charged was not serious or that such of-
fense was a misdemeanor as distinguished from a felony. It could
with reasonable safety be ventured that any conviction, regardless
of the nature of the charge or the seriousness of the punishment,
will be reversed where it can be shown "that without a lawyer a
defendant could not have an adequate and fair defense."2 4-H. H.
19342 U.S. 142, 72 S. Ct. 191, 96 L. Ed. 154 (1951); see also Bute v. Illinois, 333 US. 640,
1-8 S. Ct. 763, 92 L. Ed. 986 (1948); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 72 S Ct. 141, 96 L. Ed.
99 (1951); Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 75 S. Ct. 145, 99 L. Ed. 135 (1954)
Smith v. O'Grody, 312 U.S. 329, 61 S. Ct. 572, 85 L. Ed. 859 (1941); House v Mayo, 324
U.S. 42, 65 S. Ct. 517, 89 L. Ed. 739 (1945); Rive v. Olson, 324 US. 786, 65 S. Ct. 989, 89 L. Ed.
1367 (1945); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 68 S. Ct. 1270, 92 L. Ed. 1647 (1948); Uveges v
Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 69 S. Ct. 184, 93 L. Ed. 127 (1948).
s' Townsend v Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 S. Ct. 1252, 92 L. Ed. 1690 (1948); Palmer v. Ashe
342 6.S. 142, 72 S. Ct. 191, 96 L. Ed. 154 (1951); Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 75 S. Ct.
145, 99 L. Ed. 135 (1954).
Gibbs v Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 69 S. Ct. 1247, 93 L. Ed. 1686.
23White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 65 S. Ct. 978, 89 L. Ed. 1348.
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